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Abstract
Generally, there are two opposing sides when discussing the epistemology of the law, 
namely realist and anti-realist. The point of difference between the two sides includes 
several topics responding to the basic topics related to the definition, scope, methodology 
and truth that want to be achieved by the science of law. This research aims are to 
answer some of the epistemological problems of jurisprudence and what philosophical 
assumptions based on and methodological implications for achieving truth in realist and 
anti-realist tensions. This article uses a conceptual review of the epistemic study of law. 
The result of this research is that the epistemology discourse of jurisprudence has been a 
topic of debate for a long time and stems from tensions between rationalism, empiricism, 
and pragmatism. Methodological differences also have logical consequences for the 
attainment of the truth that realists and anti-realists aim to address. Correspondence 
becomes the truth to be achieved by law according to the realist. In contrast to the belief 
of anti-realists who believe that the truth is not just a statement, but it becomes true if it 
fits and supports with other statements. Whereas pragmatic assumes the validity of the 
law is measured by its validity at its usefulness.
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IntroDuctIon
The discourse on the vulnerability of jurisprudence about its scholarship is an 
ongoing debate. The debate about the science of law can also be observed from 
the dialogue between Scholten and Langemeijer some time ago1. Scholten argues 
that the scientific method in the field of legal science (rechtswetenschappelijke 
method) is characterized by demands that bear a scientific character of the type: in 
its processing of positive law (laws, judicial decisions, doctrines), legal scientists 
seek to achieve objectivity (taking all material -the given materials relevant to 
the review, study, discussion); seeking unity (avoiding direct conflict; seeking 
internal coherence) and seeking simplicity (with the formation of a sense as 
dense as possible). Although jurisprudence is also, in particular, an ars (art), a 
skill, it is not mistaken to bear that name.
Scholten’s opinion above got a reaction from Langemeijer in his work titled 
Inleiding Tot de Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, he doubted the scientific nature of law. 
Langemeijer emphasizes the issue that jurisprudence operates with a variety 
of very different given materials (dogmatic deduction from the order of laws 
and regulations, exploring the driving forces that have influenced the history of 
the law, determining the tradition before the enactment of laws by law, it takes 
into account the practical impact of various decisions) and finally of the various 
1 Visser’t Hooft, 2009, Filosofie van de Rechtswetenschap, translated by Arief Sidharta, Philosophy of 
Law, Laboratory of Law University of Parahyangan, Bandung, p. 24-26.
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diverse materials given that the methods collected (compiled) must be drawn to the final 
conclusion with an assessment of good and bad.
Discourse on the subject of the science of law then emerged or found a new moment 
when Carel Stolker delivered a scientific oration in the framework of the 428th 
anniversary of Leiden University on 7 February 2003. The oration was titled, Ja, geleerd 
zijn Jullie wel. The oration contains several important points relating to doubts in the 
level of scientific knowledge of law related to juridical controversies, especially in 
providing different answers in wrongful birth and wrongful life arrest.2
Debate about legal epistemology has also occurred between Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) 
and Sir Frederick Pollock (1845-1937). The two figures represent the two traditions of 
thinking that have become a large current in legal thought, namely between pure legal 
theory and social legal theory. This debate is also packaged in a number of similar terms 
such as mechanical jurisprudence versus social legal science (socio-legal jurisprudence). 
Pound in his article entitled “Mechanical Jurisprudence” attacks the three scientific 
characters attached by Pollock to jurisprudence namely equality, certainty and justice. 
According to him, the proposed criteria put more emphasis on the internal structure 
of law, even though the scientific measure of law is on the achievement of the legal 
goal of justice. The character of scientific scholarship is useful in reducing the moral 
gap in humans. The fragile nature makes it easy to fall into the desire for power and 
corruption3.
Dissenting opinions about the nature of legal scholarship as outlined above can be 
interested in several basic topics related to the method and nature of science itself. 
Philosophy of law itself is considered to contain vulnerability as a science. Vulnerability 
of law as a science, according to Stolker, is caused by the overlapping of researchers with 
the object of research, the intertwining of scientific research with legal practice, and the 
normative character of law, which makes it more directed to ‘ought’ rather than ‘is’4.
In short, modern jurisprudence embodies two different thought traditions about the 
nature of law. First, adopt a scientific approach that assumes that all legal phenomena 
have universal characteristics that can be used in the analysis of all types of legal systems. 
Secondly, another form of reflection on jurisprudence views law as a complicated form 
of moral regulation that can only be analyzed from within a system of reflective moral 
and political practice. Instead of searching for neutral perspectives or criteria, this 
second form of theorization suggests that the nature and purpose of law are revealed by 
reflecting the dynamic nature of legal practice.
2 The case began when a daughter, Kelly, was legally represented by her parents, several years ago demanding 
LUMC Leiden (Leiden University Teaching Hospital) before the court. He blamed the hospital for allowing him to be 
born into the world. He was born into a world with severe mental and physical disabilities. The incident according 
to his parents could have been prevented if before the child was born and during pregnancy the amniotic fluid was 
administered or the vlokken test was performed. Such tests will necessarily show that Kelly suffers from a special 
genetic disorder. If only Kelly’s parents knew about it early on, then surely they would have decided to have an abor-
tion. To answer this problem various opinions about the application of wrongful life: 1. The child is entitled to get full 
compensation for the loss he experienced (due to his disability) (Cour de Cassation of France, The Hague High Court 
and a number of other writers; 2. The child not entitled to compensation (German Bundesgerichshof and almost all 
American court decisions; 3. Parents are not the child who is entitled to compensation (The Hague District Court), 
4. The child is entitled to compensation for the losses he suffers; must pay is the state is not a doctor (French law-
maker); 5. The child is entitled to get two guilders and seventy-five cents (legal philosopher) Carel Stolker, 2011, ‘Ja, 
geleerd zijn Jullie wel, translated by Tristam Moeliono, Must be in Admit, You Are Indeed Educated: Regarding the 
Scientific Status of Legal Studies’, Scientific oration in the framework of the 428th anniversary of Leiden University 
on 7 February 2003, in Tentang Keilmiahan Ilmu Hukum, Faculty of Law, Parahyangan University, Bandung, p. 3
3 Roscoe Pound, 1908, Mechanical Jurisprudence, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 8, Desember, p. 605-623.
4 Ibid, p. 13.
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Reflections on legal scholarship will also be related to the method of legal science in 
finding the truth. The truth of jurisprudence is carried out in the adversary method 
which is carried out in the courtroom, not through scientific research5. The truth 
achieved by the method of contention will also change from time to time. In addition, 
the debate related to the vulnerability of the science of law is related to the position of 
law in the constitutive aspect of science.
This article limits the discussion to several points of reflection, namely how is the 
epistemology of jurisprudence and what philosophical assumptions are underlying? 
What are the methodological implications and the attainment of truth in the tension of 
the diversity of realist and anti-realist perspectives? To answer some of these questions, 
this paper uses philosophical reflection on the values  of scientific reasoning and truth. 
This article positions itself as a conceptual study of epistemic law. 
AnAlySIS AnD DIScuSSIon
Definition of Science
Before exploring further the scientific nature of the science of law, you should need 
to clarify what is meant by science? As a prelude, according to Liek Wilardjo, science 
is defined as all the knowledge gathered by humans through activities that go along the 
hypothetical-deductive-verification cycle. Tracks that are components of the cycle are 
scavenging (induction), elaboration (deduction), and verification or validation6.
Science has three foundations, namely the foundation of o ntology, epistemology, 
and axiology. The foundation of ontology is often known as a study of everything that 
is objective and subjective that is often conceptualized as reality. The ins and outs of 
this reality are made by science as the object of claim to find out everything. These 
realities, both concrete and abstract, exist in the human empirical environment7. The 
basis of epistemology is often also called the theory of knowledge8 to discuss in-depth 
and critically all the processes that are seen in an attempt to obtain knowledge (scientific 
methodology), which includes what is science, the limits, and benchmarks of validity9. 
The final foundation, namely the axiological or theologi c al foundation of science, 
is a study of the goals or values   to which knowledge i s  being achieved. Axiological 
or teleological foundation refers to the values   held in determining the development, 
choosing and determining priorities of the research field, and applying and utilizing 
knowledge10.
These values  can be divided into values  that are internal (constitutive) or co-eternal 
(contextual)11. Values  that are internal (constitutive) are related to cognitive values  which 
normatively need to be considered by the practitioners of science so that the rationality 
5 Peter Ladefoged, 2011, The law is Not Science: The Validity of Voice Identification, in Widodo Dwi Putro, Kritik 
Terhadap Paradigma Positivisme Hukum, Genta Publishing, Jogjakarta, p. 111.
6 Liek Wilardjo, 2009. Menerawang di Kala Senggang: Kumpulan Tulisan Liek Wilardjo, Penerbit Teknik Elektro 
dan Program Pascasarjana Studi Pembangunan Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, Salatiga, Cet. I., p. 23.
7 Liek Wilardjo, 2005. Hipotetikalitas: Ketidakpastian dan Pilihan Etis, dalam Integrasi Ilmu dan Agama: Interpre-
tasi dan Aksi, Editor: Zainal Abidin Bagir, Jarot Wahyudi, Afnan Anshori, Mizan, Bandung, p. 112.
8 Konrad Kebung Beoang, 1997. Plato: Jalan Menuju Pengetahuan Yang Benar, Jogjakarta: Kanisius, p. 9.
9 Jujun Suriasumantri, 2006. Tentang Hakikat Ilmu: Sebuah Pengantar Redaksi, dalam buku, Ilmu dalam Perspek-
tif: Sebuah Kumpulan Karangan tentang Hakekat Ilmu (edt: Jujun Suriasumantri) Cet. 16, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 
Jakarta, p. 9.
10 Liek Wilardjo, 1990. Realita dan Desiderata, Duta Wacana University Press, Jogjakarta, hlm. 23. Lihat juga Liek 
Wilardjo, 1987. Ilmu: Antara Sikap dan Pengetahuan, Jurnal Prisma, No.3/Th. XVI, Maret.
11 J. Sudarminta, 2009. Epistemologi: Masihkah Kita Perlukan, Jurnal Diskursus Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober, p. 145-168.
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of science is maintained. These values  become a source of rules that determine whether 
a scientific method or certain work procedures in the practice of science activities means 
that the constitutive value is closely related to the methodological problems inherent in 
the value of honesty and truth.
Each epistemological tradition assumes that the truth of a knowledge can be obtained 
thanks to the method it uses12. This methodology will determine the scientific truth 
obtained from the scientific research process13. A truth is not possible without the stages 
that must be passed to obtain scientific knowledge. The selection of the right method 
for doing scientific work is the key to accurately describing the object of a scientific 
study. The right method will then determine the quality of the intended scientific truth. 
The scientific truth in question is the compatibility between what is claimed as known 
with reality. Truth lies in the correspondence between subject and object, that is, what 
the subject knows and reality as it really is. In other words, there is a correspondence 
between the statements in the theory and objective reality in the world. Scientific activity 
is considered as an attempt to find the truth about this world. The scientific method is 
believed to guarantee the objectivity of the truth of the knowledge it produces because 
the steps taken in conducting research are believed to be logical, rational and coherent.
Scientists based on their profession are bound by the obligation to free themselves 
from, what Bacon calls, various forms of ‘idols’ or subjective and collective biases. They 
need to free themselves from the interests and values  that are not constitutive attached 
to science itself14. In the process of research activities, scientists are required to maintain 
an objective attitude. Objectivity is a very high regard and inherent in the nature of 
science itself.
Objectivity which is claimed to be universal then becomes a hot debate in relation to 
the dichotomy of subject-objects in social science can be maintained because the results 
of knowledge are always subjective objective. This means that the knower’s subject is 
actively constructing the object as it is known. Then the clear picture of the objectivity 
of science is challenged historically and sociologically that science as a human activity 
is essentially a science activity that cannot be separated from the historical, sociological, 
and cultural context of the community of the perpetrators. Moreover, in the discourse 
of modern science philosophy illustrates how the objectivity of scientific truths is often 
misused. Science projects that the perpetrators claim to be objective, universal and value-
free are in fact subjective, local and full of values  and even tend to support totalitarian 
and discriminatory policies15.
conception of legal Studies 
What is the law? It is a question that has beguiled and defined generations of theorists.16 
From Tamanaha’s statement, the question of what is law is the side of the problem 
that found no agreement among intellectuals and legal theorists. The law is defined in 
12 Imam Wahyudi, 2004. Refleksi Tentang Kebenaran Ilmu, Jurnal Filsafat UGM, Desember, Jilid 38, Nomor 3, p. 
255.
13 Sonny Keraf dan Mikhael Dua, 2002. Ilmu Pengetahuan : Sebuah Tinjauan Epistemologis, Kanisius, Yogyakarta, 
p. 66.
14 J. Sudarminta, 2008. Objektivitas Kebenaran Ilmiah: Mungkinkah?¸ Jurnal Diskursus, Vol. 7, No. 2, Oktober, p. 
118.
15 F. Budi Hardiman, 2009. Kritik Ideologi: Menyingkap Pertautan Pengetahuan dan Kepentingan Bersama Jur-
gen Habermas, Kanisius, Jogjakarta also read F. Budi Hardiman, 2009. Menuju masyarakat Komunikatif: Ilmu, mas-
yarakat, Politik dan Posmodernisme Menurut Jurgen habermas, Kanisius, Jogjakarta. 
16 Brian Z. Tamanaha, 2008. Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, paper #08-0095, January, p. 1.
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various ways and explained according to the thinking of each jurist. Legal definitions 
will vary and are as many opinions from experts who put forward them. For example, 
ten legal experts argue that ten or more definitions of law will be born. 
The variety of legal definitions can be summarized from the conception of law by 
several major philosophers until the 19th century (nineteenth) who wrote:
Law, as Plato said that law is a form of social control and an instrument for realizing 
a good life. Reasons to be realized in reality, the real reality of social structures. Aristo-
tle said law was a rule of conduct, a contract, and an ideal reason, a policy rule, a tool 
of order. Cicero said the law was an agreement based on reason to achieve the common 
good that was made to care for the community. Bacon believes certainty is the main thing 
required by law. According to Hobbes law is an order from the holder of sovereignty. Ac-
cording to Spinoza the law is a plan of life. According to Leibniz, law is the character to 
maintain the structure of society. According to Locke law is a norm that exists for welfare. 
According to Hume, law is a body of precepts. According to Kant, law is a will of harmony 
which means universal rules for the benefit of independence. According to Fichte, law is a 
relation between human existence. According to Hegel the law is the realization of ideas 
about rights17.
Theorists in the nineteenth century who came from several different scientific 
disciplines discussed law as the subject of his study.
For Max Weber, law exists when a group of people who are ready to apply coercion to 
apply the norm; according to Bronislaw Malinowski, law is rules that are discovered and 
formed as important aspects of social life; for Eugene Ehrlich, those laws are rules that 
arise spontaneously from agreed actions originating from the order of social associations; 
for Roscoe Pound, law is social control within a political society organization; for 
Paul Bohannan, law is habits that are re-institutionalized by their enforcement for a 
purpose; for Donald Black, law is social control by the government; for Lon Fuller, law 
is the subjectivity of human behavior compiled by government into rules; for Hart, law 
consists of primary rules applied to social rules, and secondary rules by law enforcement 
followed to recognize, change, and apply to primary rules; for Niklas Luhmann, law is 
an aspect of a social system to facilitate expected behavior18.
With regard to variety and agreement between legal theorists about what is the 
law? Tamanaha grouped law in three important concepts and definitions which were 
categorized: first, law as social order; both laws are elements of state law; third, law is 
related to the term justice or truth (justice or right category)19.
Of the three categories of legal concepts is not an absolute is accepted as true. The 
different conceptions of law are inseparable from the nature of the law itself which is 
a product of reason and social activity. Is not it increasingly different between social 
activities with one another will give birth to a different law. At least, from the legal 
category will also emerge a new orientation, new theoretical formulations to understand 
the contemporary development of law, especially if it is associated with rapid changes 
in social society (increasing population and urbanization), political structure (more 
emergence of secular states), economy (domination from global capitalism), technology.
17 Huntington Cairns, 1949. Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, p. 556.
18 Brian Z. Tamanaha, 1995. An Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law, Oxford J. Leg. 
Stud, p. 15: 501-535.
19 Brian Tamanaha, Law…op.cit, p. 6-11.
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legal Science Methodology
Science, according to Patrick, is a painting or description that is complete and consistent 
about the facts of experience in terms as simple as possible or as little as possible20. 
According to A.F. Chalmers, it is knowledge that has been proven true. Scientific theories 
are drawn in a strict manner from the facts of experience obtained through observation 
and experimentation. Scientific knowledge is trustworthy knowledge because it has 
been proven objectively true, science is a structure that is built on facts21. According 
to Archie J. Bahm, Knowledge is called scientific if it fulfills six components, namely: 
problem, attitude, method, activity, conclusion, and effects22. Whereas I.R. Poejawijatna, 
said that knowledge is called scientific, so it must be objective, methodic, universal, and 
consistent23.
There are many methods (sources/theories) in talking about epistemology. A long-
known debate between rationalism versus empiricism. Finally emerged the pragmatism 
flow. Although these three theories do not specifically discuss the philosophy of law, the 
three have influenced the basic epistemology of law. Each of the three epistemological 
theories leaves quite a strong imprint in a variety of legal theories and methodological 
thinking that are claimed to fit into the nature of legal science.
The three theories of epistemology, namely rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism. 
In the discourse of developing jurisprudence, it developed into three main features/
variants of law. Metamorphosed rationalism is known as legal formalism or legal 
positivism, which postulates the rationalization and synthesis of law. That law is 
supposed or idealized. Empiricism came to be known as legal realism which believed 
that the law was actually based on experience. The judge decides first based on facts not 
regulations. Legal pragmatism then emerged as a synthesis of the two previous schools. 
Legal pragmatism tries to combine pure legal reasoning with the idealization of law to 
form realistic social-legal theories (realistic socio-legal theory) as developed by Brian Z. 
Tamanaha24.
Starting from such philosophical assumptions, the methodology of legal science is 
divided into two major streams, traditional (internal ways) and modern perspectives 
(external ways). The first methodology tends to approach the law in the way of black 
letter law logic. Legal doctrine can only be understood and explained by jurists or 
lawyers with a normative character. Law is seen as operating in a social, economic and 
political vacuum. The existing law in the form of laws and decisions on previous cases 
is the starting point.
Without denying the demystification effect produced by the approach or the elements 
of truth it contains, it is easy to show that the objectivity sought and the proposed 
explanation mutilate the actual legal phenomena. Externalities in the case proved to 
be misleading and reductionist. This normative dimension is undoubtedly the subject 
of rationalization and interpretation by lawyers themselves: a phenomenon of self-
20 Jujun S. Suriasumantri, 1993. Filsafat Ilmu, Sebuah Pengantar Populer, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, Ja-
karta, p. 59.
21 G.T.W. Patrick, 1958. Introduction to philosophy, London: tp., p. 375.
22 Archie J. Bahm, 1980. What is Science? dalam bukunya, Axiology: The Science of Value, World Book, 
Al-Bequerque, New Mexico, (14-49) atau reprinted, p. 1-36.
23 A.G.M. Van Melsen, 1992. Wetenschap en I eranwoordelijkheid, alih bahasa K. Bertens dengan judul “Ilmu Penge-
tahuan dan Tanggung Jawab Kita”, Gramedia, Jakarta, p. 65-67.
24 Brian Z. Tamanaha, 1997. Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, p. 246.
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interpretation that characterizes the object of all human and social sciences. No doubt, it 
is precisely from this self-interpretation that science, as understood from the perspective 
of external explanations, aspires to free itself. But in doing so aren’t they forced to 
reduce the law to facts or at least to non-legal norms25? The statement is the view of 
other theorists who reject the explanatory paradigm that supports understanding from 
an internal perspective
Externalization paves the way for internalization, objectivity for subjectivity. The 
Raison d’être of social phenomena lies in its internal understanding, which is clarified 
by means of representation, conventions, and rules that are common to reference groups. 
For legal studies, this means the kind of knowledge that, without the shared ambition of 
legal dogma ambitions, will embrace the paradigm (which sometimes takes the form of 
myths and dogmas, as we have seen) used in the practical discourse of lawyers. Here it is 
also easy to show the unsatisfactory nature of this position which removes the scientific 
viewpoint from real autonomy by giving legal principles not only the status of the object 
of study (legitimate), but also the validity criteria of the theory (which can hardly be 
called scientific) .
If someone rejects the position of an external observer and also someone who is in an 
internal position, should one conclude that it is impossible to have jurisprudence? Not 
if someone wants to follow the third position, namely from a ‘moderate external point 
of view’ or ‘the point of view of an external observer who relies on the internal point 
of view of the Juris. In other words, this means that there is a dialectical interaction 
between the paradigm of explanation and interpretation. Although it seems clear that 
only an objective external point of view can lead to scientific explanatory theories, it is 
not at all contrary to this position to be adopted as an object of study.
‘Internal understanding’ or ‘self-interpretation’ used by lawyers. First, legal 
phenomena are described in the discourse by the authorities and legal subjects, which 
involve an understanding of the explicit and implicit conventions in the discourse. Then 
in the second phase, which is fully scientific, these discursive practices are explained 
(related causally or teleologically to certain types of environmental phenomena). This 
third phase leads to a comprehensive reinterpretation of the object of research. Therefore, 
the explanation makes it possible to develop from a naive and instinctive understanding 
to critical and constructive understanding26.
Has this process reached the point where various approaches are no longer relevant 
to scientific matters? To make this statement means to ignore the latest developments 
in the epistemology of the natural sciences which have produced extensive revisions 
of the conventional sense of observation and explanation. Without going further 
into the matter, it will be limited to remind that the ‘facts’ learned by contemporary 
natural science are not taken from and observed in ‘nature’ by our external senses but 
are produced by complex and artificial experimental processes. Fully mediated by the 
techniques and theoretical languages  that govern the experimental process. As a result, 
traditional criteria of control (verif i cation) tend to give way to scientific statement 
criteria: theoretical interpretations a re good when providing the most satisfying 
explanation of known phenomena and opening up a large number of perspectives about 
phenomena.
25 Mark Van Hoecke and François Ost, 2010. Epistemological Perspectives In Jurisprudence, dalam Legal Theory and 
the Legal Academy. Ed. Maksymilian Del Mar. Vol. 3. Ashgate Publishing, Farnham UK, p. 13.
26 Ibid, p.14.
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So there is no deeper difference between natural and human sciences and even 
if specific differences remain, this is not so important that it cannot be said to be 
similar between the two approaches. What remains now is to determine the source 
of the explanatory hypothesis that is recommended for adoption by the recommended 
jurisprudence. Of course, this involves a critical perspective to see the interdisciplinary 
character of legal science.
truth in the legal Studies
A model of truth that results from a system of conflict in court, which often results 
in one party winning and one losing party. On the one hand, does the court reach the 
stage of truth in obtaining the results? Perhaps, with clear results, one would think that 
law does not require a theory of truth. However, Dennis Patterson acknowledged the 
importance of truth theory to law. In his new book, ‘Law and Truth’ Patterson argues 
that the main task of the science of law is to provide a philosophical explanation of 
what the legal propositions mean, true or false. Law and Truth involve centuries of 
philosophical debate about the idea of  truth27.
Before discussing the type of truth that  is addressed by the science of law. First, 
it needs to be explained, what is meant by truth? The term ‘truth’ is said to have ‘a 
complex structure and no simple formula that can fully capture its meaning’28. Some 
truth theorists argue that: ‘truth is a s imple logical idea, which does not require’ 
substantial ‘theoretical explanations29. F urthermore, truth does not have ‘a hidden 
structure awaiting discovery’ 30 and that ‘truth is fully captured by trifles early so that in 
reality nothing is more ordinary and not confusing than the concept of truth’31. This is 
an argument in terms of functionality and pragmatics, so ‘truth’ does not have to have a 
universal essence to function properly under certain conditions (discursive). So, while 
there may not be a universal definition of truth, good working out of that definition 
is possible32. There is even debate about how many theories of truth there are. But in 
general, there are ‘two basic theories of truth’ namely realism and anti-realism which 
refer to three substantive truth theories - correspondence, coherence, and pragmatics.
1. theory of realism / correspondence
Legal truth in a realist perspective is achieved if a claim or statement is in accordance 
with reality. In short, the statement is true if it is in accordance with the facts, and false 
if it is not in accordance with the facts’. Correspondence theory ‘is basically a proposition 
that when this or that happens, it actually happens and statements about it are true. 
For realists, the meaning of the sentence is given by the conditions that make it true. 
There are three main categories of realists: (a) naive realists; (B) critical realists, and (c) 
internal realists33. They all use the theory of correspondence about truth, that is, they 
argue that the truth of any statement is based on successful references. Realists affirm 
bi-valence, that is, they argue that the statement is true or false depending on whether 
it is appropriate or not according to the circumstances that wish to be explained. This 
27 George A. Martinez, 1997, On Law and Truth, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 883. http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/
vol72/iss3/6, p. 883.
28 Edo Pivcevic, 1997. What is Truth? (Edisi 1), Routledge, London, p. 19.
29 Ibid, p. 22.
30 Paul Horwich, 1990. Truth (2nd edition), Clarendon Press, New York, p. 2.
31 ibid, p. 21.
32 Joseph M Fernandez, 2009. An Exploration of The Meaning Of Truth In Philosophy And Law, 11 Undalr, p. 60
33 Ibid, p. 63
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theory of truth claims that the statement is true if it matches the circumstances it is 
trying to decipher.
The idea that truth is a kind of correspondence with facts, however, has never 
succeeded in satisfying anyone ‘. It is further suggested that many philosophers think that 
traditional attempts to explain ideas about facts and correspondence ‘produce nothing 
but a poor pseudo metaphysical explanation because the central concepts they use have 
absolutely no explanatory value’. Another difficulty with correspondence theory is that 
it is typically and naturally related to metaphysical realism - the view that there are 
objective realities whose existence and structure are independent of our language and 
thinking.
For correspondence theory, truth is not a matter of whether a statement is justified 
or rational - objective truth and depends only on the way the world is. So the criticism 
is that in the realism of classical correspondence we can never determine whether 
statements or beliefs are true because we cannot compare them with facts to see if 
they are in accordance with them. Statements and beliefs, as is usually argued, can be 
compared with other statements or beliefs to see whether they are in harmony with one 
another, but we can never compare or oppose statements or beliefs with facts or with 
reality. There is, as it is often said, no way to get out of our language or outside our circle 
of belief and explore the facts themselves. This epistemological objection is the main 
reason many legal philosophers abandoned classical correspondence theory and began 
offering alternative substantive theories that promised to be more loyal to our epistemic 
situation in the world.
2. theory of Anti-realism / coherence
In contrast to realism, anti-realism rejects correspondence and instead states that 
statements are true because they blend with other true statements. Coherence is when 
the elements are consistent with each other and when it shows the whole as a particular 
system. In that case, the whole system and every element is correct. Coherence theory 
is a theory that measures truth with their “compatibility” in a given system. Anti-
realists do not dispute the realist assumption that truth is a matter of conditions - where 
they part with the company whether the conditions of truth might be ‘transcendent 
recognized’. Anti-realists reject all attempts to make language a reflection of reality, and 
instead maintain that truth is basically the result of social construction. They reject 
bivalence and instead state that truth claims are internal to the community in which 
this truth is expressed, that is, truth depends on what is agreed upon in the community 
and it depends on the rules of language play, not on objective research.
Many philosophers who rejected classical correspondence theory, epistemic stories’ 
began to develop, claiming that the truth of a statement does not consist in external 
relations with features of reality but in having positive epistemic status in conceptual 
schemes or inexperience. These theories argue that the truth of judgment consists of 
being a member of a comprehensive and harmonious comprehensive belief system. The 
basic essence of the coherence theory of truth is the conception that beliefs, judgments, 
or whatever are considered as bearers of truth are ‘right or wrong according to whether 
they are compatible or not united, with other bodies of belief (or whatever) it’s true. A 
related term when discussing coherence is verification which simply, supports the view 
that the meaning of a word or combination of words is determined by a set of rules that 
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govern its use. Coherence theory is typically a theory of truth shared by idealists - those 
who defend that reality, at least as far as we can realize, is an inherent mental trait34.
3. Pragmatic truth
Pragmatism, emphasizing practice, in holding proof of the truth of a matter can be 
seen from its practical actions or in terms of usefulness. According to this flow think it is 
devoted to action. This results in that actions become criteria of thought and usefulness. 
In other words, the result of that action becomes a truth.
Pragmatic truth theory asserts that there is a close relationship between the concept 
of truth and human experience and practice. A pragmatic approach to truth is to ask 
what difference makes a belief true. Pragmatic approaches truth from an epistemic point 
of view, which incorporates the basic elements of coherence. Pragmatic truth theory is 
based on the conception of pragmatic meaning, which states that all meanings are based 
on practice, with all the different meanings involving several differences in practice, 
that is, truth is a problem that is in accordance with practice. True ideas are ideas that 
we can assimilate, validate, strengthen and verify. False ideas are things that we cannot 
have. That’s the practical difference that makes us have true ideas; therefore, that is the 
meaning of truth, because only that is known as truth.
One criticism of the pragmatic theory is that pragmatics suffer from a fundamental 
weakness namely confusing the criteria of truth with the nature of truth. It is suggested 
that not because pragmatists are ‘too ignorant’ to distinguish between criteria and 
essence - because they are well aware of the alleged difference - the objection is that the 
difference cannot last in the long run. Differences in meaning, say critics, must make a 
difference in real practice.
concluSIonS
The epistemology discourse of legal science has been a topic of debate for quite a long 
time, both in various scientific forums and in several places in the world. The base of 
this tension is the legacy of the philosophy of science that underlies it, namely the debate 
between rationalism versus empiricism. And pragmatism which is an alternative view 
that emerged later in the two major epistemic theories. The difference in the point of 
view of these theories, if traced back to their crossings, creates tension on several aspects 
of legal science. Includes differences in the definition and scope of understanding of law 
and methodology. In the aspect of the definition, there are two poles of discourse about 
the use of the term jurisprudence which must be applied to the jurisprudence diction or 
legal science. In the methodological domain, this tension continues with the emergence 
of two approaches to law, a perspective from internal / realist or external / anti-realist. 
The internal perspective sees law as a normative building that idealizes law as it should. 
Authoritatively interpreted and understood only by lawyers and jurists. On the other 
hand, the external perspective of law is understood as a building that is not always strict. 
It can be approached with a variety of approaches. The law is understood as true, they 
are called anti-realist. Methodological differences also have logical consequences for the 
attainment of the truth that realists and anti-realists aim to address. Correspondence 
becomes the truth to be achieved by law according to the realist. The truth is the 
compatibility between statements and facts. In contrast to the belief of anti-realists who 
believe that the truth is not just a statement, but it becomes true if it fits and supports 
34 Joseph M Fernandez, 2009, An Exploration Of The Meaning Of Truth In Philosophy And Law, 11 Undalr, p. 62
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with other statements. The sharpness of the difference between the legal truth according 
to the realist and anti-realist try to be broken down by the pragmatic truth theory which 
states the truth is in action. The validity of the law is measured by its validity on the 
value of use when it is in the realm of action.
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